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Globalization, the environment and the 
future “greening” of Arab politics 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The pressures of globalization, rising ecological footprint and shrinking biocapacity and 
concomitant global value change will contribute towards an increase of the importance of 
environmental issues in the Arab world in the coming years. Without question, already the 
time series data from available indices – like the KOF-Index of Globalization (2015) and 
Ecological Footprint Network data on ecological footprint and biocapicity - all point in the 
direction that in objective terms the Arab World will be confronted by a synchronous increase 
of these phenomena in the coming years. In addition, the newly available opinion data from 
the recently released World Values Survey (6) for twelve members of the Arab League 
(Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, 
Qatar, Tunisia, and Yemen), containing almost 70% of the population of the countries of the 
Arab League show to us that membership rate environmental organizations, participation in 
environmental demonstrations and giving priority to protecting the environment over 
economic growth are already a factor in those countries. Their weight will increase in the 
years to come, given the general and very robust underlying tendencies. 
 
 
 
Our article analyzes the empirical relationship between rising globalization and ecological 
performance by establishing the global long-term, structural macro-quantitative determinants 
of environmental performance in the world system with cross-national data. In multiple 
standard OLS regression models, we test the effects of 26 standard predictor variables, 
including the ‘four freedoms’ of goods, capital, labor and services, whose weight will all 
increase in the Arab world in the coming years, on the following indicators of sustainable 
development  
 
 
 
 avoiding net trade of ecological footprint gha per person 
 
 Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP 
 
 CO2 per capita 
 
 Yale/Columbia Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 
 
 Global footprint per capita 
 
 Happy Life Years 
 
 Happy Planet Index 
  4 
 
 ln (number of people per mill inhabitants 1980-2000 killed by natural disasters per year+1) 
 
 
 
Our research shows that the apprehensions of quantitative research, critical of neo-liberal 
globalization are fully vindicated by the significant negative environmental effects of the 
foreign savings rate. High foreign savings are indeed a driver of global footprint, and are a 
blockade against a satisfactory Happy Planet Index performance. The new international 
division of labor is one of the prime drivers of high CO2 per capita emissions. The penetration 
of economies by foreign direct investments by transnational corporations, which is the master 
variable of most quantitative dependency theories (MNC penetration), blocks environmental 
performance (EPI-Index) and several other socially important processes. Worker remittances 
have a significant positive effect on the Happy Planet Index, and Happy Life Years.  
 
 
 
In attempting to draw some cautious predictions for the Arab World, the article then evaluates 
the performance of the Arab countries in this context with our cross-national data and with 
our analysis of World Values Survey (6) data for the region. While the documented data for 
the region from the Yale/Columbia EPI Index, which is the best single-shot available global 
environmental quality indicator today, and the Ecological Footprint Network time series data 
about rising ecological footprint and shrinking biocapacity in the Arab countries clearly 
indicate the sharply mounting and pressing environmental policy priorities in the region, the 
“greening” of Arab civil societies towards a higher degree of environmental consciousness 
and activism already is also becoming a considerable factor. The overall publics in Qatar and 
Libya are in the lead, while in the other Arab countries, environmental policy issues will gain 
considerably in importance in the public mindset as well. Decision makers would be well 
advised to channel already now these future environmental debates and movements to be 
expected in a way compatible with the overall well-being, prosperity, democratization and 
stability of the region. 
 
 
Keywords: International Relations and International Political Economy; International 
Migration; Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics - General 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: F5, F22, Q00  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The issues under empirical scrutiny here have an enormous importance for the future of 
policy-making on a global scale, and also for the decision makers in the Arab World. With the 
United Nations environmental conference Rio + 20 having ended in Rio de Janeiro, 
1
 the 
substantial issues remain on the table: what are the real drivers and bottlenecks of 
environmental performance, and what is the role of neo-liberal globalization in the process? 
And can there be any tendency towards an improvement in environmental trends as long as 
the global order is being based on neo-liberal globalization? Without question, the major 
world religions are already developing a high profile in global environmental questions. 
2
 The 
world religion of Islam, too, highlights the importance of the ecological agenda. 
3
 For a 
number of years now, also Western mainstream media talk about the “greening of Islam”. 4 
 
Also for the European partner countries of what is now being called the “Union for the 
Mediterranean”, the questions under scrutiny here have a special significance. The 
Arab/European partnership in the framework of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean strategy (Union 
for the Mediterranean) 
5
 is planned to promote economic integration and democratic reform 
across 16 neighbors to the EU’s south in North Africa and the Middle East. Formerly known 
as the Barcelona Process, cooperation agreements were re-launched in 2008 as the Union for 
the Mediterranean (UfM). Projects address areas are now the economy, the environment, 
energy, health, migration and culture. Along with the current 28 EU member states, 15 
Southern Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern countries are members of the Union for 
the Mediterranean: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (suspended), Tunisia 
and Turkey.  
 
Let us recall here that this particular region of the world economy set out to make the EU to 
become a ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive economy’. The EU-2020 strategy, which now 
substitutes the now defunct ‘Lisbon agenda’, which was the main policy strategy of the 
European Union from 2000 to 2010, 
6
 aims to make Europe a lot ‘greener’ by 2020. Europe 
must acquire, so the reasoning of Commission ex-President José Manuel Durao Barroso 
(http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/about/political/index_en.htm), global 
leadership on climate change and developing new sources of sustainable growth and social 
cohesion. Europe should become a low emission economy, and should move in particular 
towards decarbonizing our electricity supply and the transport sector and should develop 
clean and electric cars. 
7
 Critics might say at this point that Europe better should mend its 
own, decaying common currency, the €, first, and that it is presumptuous to talk about the 
future until 2020, when entire countries, like Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (the 
so-called P-I-I-G-S) are on the verge of financial collapse. But let us look more into the 
                                                 
1
 http://www.uncsd2012.org/ (download: May 20, 2015) and http://www.unep.org/rio20/  
2
 http://fore.yale.edu/www.ifees.org  
3
 http://fore.yale.edu/religion/islam/  
4
 http://blogs.vancouversun.com/2011/09/29/the-gradual-greening-of-islam/  
5
 http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm  
6
  to make the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion", by 2010 (see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm ) 
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm  
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details. EU-Commission ex-President Barroso underlined his unmistaken belief in 
globalization and ‘world economic openness’ as a driver of Europe’s future strategy: 
 
‘Openness is critical to Europe's future competitiveness. This is not just a question of political 
preference. It is in our self-interest as the world's leading exporter.’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/about/political/index_en.htm) 
 
The question how to make Europe a lot ‘greener’ by 2020, how to acquire global leadership 
on climate change and developing new sources of sustainable growth and social cohesion, 
how to become a low emission economy, how to move in particular towards decarbonizing 
our electricity supply and the transport sector and how develop clean and electric cars has a 
universal message, not just a European one, and has implications especially also for the other 
highly-developed Western democracies, such as Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New 
Zealand and the United States of America.  
 
In this quantitative research paper, we will first re-analyze the solid and accumulating macro-
political and macro-sociological evidence on a global scale, published in the world’s leading 
peer-reviewed social science journals, which all seems to indicate that there are indeed serious 
contradictions between unfettered globalization and unfettered world economic openness on 
the one hand and sustainable development for all the countries of the world system on the 
other hand.  
 
For the first time, we evaluate the combined evidence about the effects of various 
manifestations of ultra-liberal globalization (and not just one process alone) on an entire 
variety of environmental indicators, such as the country performance measured by: avoiding 
net trade of ecological footprint gha per person; avoiding high carbon emissions per capita; 
avoiding high carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP; avoiding high ecological 
footprint (g ha /cap); a good Environmental Performance Index (EPI); a good performance on 
the Happy life years scale; a good performance on the Happy Planet Index, HPI; and avoiding 
becoming victim of natural disasters. We thus present a new empirical synthesis about 
peculiar tendencies, already studied by a number of researchers, most notably Jorgenson, 
2003; 2004, 2005, 2006 in all detail, who suggested that there indeed seems to be a strong 
interaction between ‘transnational capitalist penetration’ and single measures of 
‘environmental degradation’. Notably enough, not one of these studies used the combined 
Yale/Columbia indices of the environmental situation, the ‘Environmental Sustainability 
Index (ESI)’ and the ‘Environmental Performance Index (EPI)’, available today for a very 
wide range of countries, and they relied instead on a startling variety of approximately 
eighteen single major environmental indicators, ranging from carbon dioxide emissions; 
deforestation; ecological footprint; emission of organic water pollutants; energy use; 
environmental protection efforts; fertilizer and pesticide consumption; greenhouse gas 
emissions; growth of ecological footprint; industrial organic water pollution, infant mortality; 
nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide gas; 
nitrous oxide emissions; organic water pollution; pesticide consumption; pesticide and 
fertilizer use; threatened mammal species; total carbon dioxide emissions and emissions per 
unit of production to water pollution, and infant mortality, often available for only a limited 
number of developing nations, and often excluding the experience of the countries of East and 
Central Europe and the former USSR, and other post-communist nations and the Arab World. 
But none of these studies looked at the effects of the entire variety of globalization processes 
on the entire variety of environmental indicators.  
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Precisely this is the aim of the present study. The rest of this study is organized as follows. In 
section 2, and due to limitations of space, we only very briefly sketch the main critical 
theories and earlier major studies on the subject. Section 3 presents the data and the research 
design. The main results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the 
environmental performance scales and environmental consciousness of the Arab World by 
global comparison, and Section 6 finally summarizes the study. The appendices should 
document our results and should be an invitation for the Arab research community to further 
use and test our explanations. 
8
 
 
 
2. Environmental development theory  
 
 
Due to the usual limitations of space in international social science journals, our sketch of the 
relevant theories under scrutiny here is very brief indeed. In this survey, we concentrate on 
mainstream and “critical” theories in global social science, as evidenced in the leading global 
peer-reviewed journals. As it is too well known and even if one risks stating the obvious, the 
neo-classical/neo-liberal approach, culminating in the Washington Consensus, wants open 
markets and no barriers, and thinks that the private sector is much better equipped than the 
public sector, and intends to reduce public deficits (see Rodrik, 2006; Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi, 2004; Tausch/Ghymers, 2006). Indicators of ‘economic freedom’ will be 
dramatically and positively associated with economic, social and even environmental 
performance according to such a reading of realities (Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe, 
1999). Declining and restructured public sectors, deregulation and privatization, higher labor 
market flexibility, higher savings, international competition for locations of productions, 
international tax competition, price stability and budget consolidation will be the main drivers 
of efficiency, economic growth, investment, and a cleaner environment. 
 
The omnipresent neo-liberal approach would stress that ‘market methods’ for pollution 
control are the best alternative available to the world. Economists should care about the 
determination of fee schedules, issues of spatial and temporal variation in fees or allowable 
emissions under permits, the life of permits and their treatment for tax purposes, rules 
governing the transfer of pollution rights, procedures for the monitoring and enforcement of 
emissions limitations, and so on. In the neo-liberal flagship article on environmental 
economics, Cropper and Oates welcome the ‘growing receptiveness to incentive-based 
approaches to environmental management’ (Cropper and Oates, 1992: 728-731). 
 
One very consistent counter-perspective to this neo-liberal Washington Consensus, and 
increasingly also ‘European Commission approach’ is the Kalecki/Steindl-paradigm (see 
Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2004), based on the works of the political economists 
Michal Kalecki (June 22
nd
 1899 – April 17th 1970) and Josef Steindl (April 14th 1912 – March 
7
th
 1993), emphasizing the factors of anti-cyclical policy (cycle and trend have the same 
determinants), demand, international cooperation, lower household savings, a rise of the 
public sector, a rising wage share, tax coordination, technology and educational policy as 
promoters of economic growth and employment (Kalecki, 1971; Steindl, 1952, 1990). The 
contrast with the contemporary neo-liberal agenda could not be starker: 
 
 
Table 1: The counter-perspective of the Kalecki-Steindl-paradigm, compared to the 
                                                 
8
 For the debate in Europe, see: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm  
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current global neo-liberal agenda 
 
 
Differences in growth strategies  
Steindl–Kaleckian growth policy Current mainstream on growth 
 
Full employment as main political concerns Price stability and budget consolidation as main 
political concerns 
Demand as growth driver Supply as growth driver 
Higher effective demand to raise employment Higher labor market flexibility to raise economic 
growth 
Technology and educational policy  Deregulation and privatization 
Lower household savings Higher savings (for investment) 
Stable or rising wage share Falling wage share (real unit labor costs) 
Anti-cyclical policy (cycle and trend have the same 
determinants) 
No active anti-cyclical policy (irrelevant for 
growth path) 
Rise of public sector promotes growth (through 
effective demand) 
Decline and restructuring of the public sector 
(efficiency) 
Tax coordination International tax competition 
International cooperation International competition (location) 
 
Source: Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2004 
 
 
Dependency and world systems theories, which start from a similar general outlook as the 
Kalecki/Steindl paradigm, in turn culminate in predicting, with Cardoso, 
9
1979 the following 
processes to happen: 
 
 There is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers 
of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery, 
 This produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies 
and between them and the centers, 
 This leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery, 
 This favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations, and 
 These require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of 
the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, 
foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979). 
 
For these approaches, low comparative price levels, high foreign savings, the openings of the 
national economies to free production zones, a low MNC outward investment presence on the 
world markets (MNC headquarter status) and a high MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per 
GDP, as well as a high world economic openness, measured by the export-share per GDP + 
import-share per GDP, all could constitute possible negative (sustainable) development 
bottlenecks. 
 
                                                 
9
 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the social scientist and former President of Brazil, is an especially important name 
to mention here for Arab audiences; see the website of his Think-Tank Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso at 
http://www.ifhc.org.br/ (currently best available in Portuguese). Cardoso the social scientist and Cardoso the 
President combined a sharp awareness of the problems of dependency in the periphery countries of the world 
with a clear commitment to initiate measures to save the Amazon region of Brazil from extinction. 
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The relatively coherent tendency of these studies suggests that there seems to be a strong 
interaction between transnational capitalist penetration and environmental degradation, 
especially in third world countries. 
10
 To date, the most important neo-liberal counter-study to 
this fledging scientific tradition was the essay by Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw, and Jenkins, 
2002, which analyzed deforestation rates, 1980-1995 in the developing countries. 
 
In this article, we will duly take into account several indicators of globalization and 
dependency, which are being measured by the following different variables of ‘(in)/dependent 
development’ (for a more through debate on globalization and inequality, see also: Herkenrath 
and Bornschier, 2003; Herkenrath, Koenig, Scholtz, and Volken, 2005; Heshmati and Tausch, 
2007; Tausch and Heshmati, 2011):  
 
 MNC penetration (MNC PEN) measures the different degrees of weight that foreign 
capital investments have in the host countries, i.e. the UNCTAD percentages of the 
stocks of multinational corporation investments per total host country GDP. This 
research tradition has been especially developed, as we already mentioned, by the 
Swiss sociologist Volker Bornschier and his school. Bornschier and his school 
predicted a strong negative determination of development by a high MNC penetration, 
due to the negative consequences, monopolies have on the long term development 
trajectory of countries 
 
 We also ascertain the growth of MNC penetration over time (DYN MNC PEN), 
from 1995 to 2005. The Bornschier school expected short-term dynamic effects from 
such MNC penetration increases 
 
 
 Equally, Bornschier and his school already developed a high theoretical and empirical 
awareness about the long-term consequences of the presence or absence of ‘MNC 
headquarter status’ (MNC HEADQU), measured in our analysis by the indicator 
MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP. Bornschier and his school expected that a 
high headquarter status mitigates against the long-term negative effects of MNC 
penetration 
 
 FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population is the indicator, 
best suited to measure the new international division of labor (NIDL). 
Froebel/Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980 already predicted the unfettered rise of this model 
(‘export processing zones’), especially in China and Southeast Asia. 
Froebel/Heinrichs/Kreye, 1980 was followed, among others, by the studies Rondinelli, 
1987; Ross, 2004; and Singa-Boyenge, 2007. Export Processing Zones (EPZ) – or 
‘Free Production Zones’ already account for some 80 percent of the merchandise 
exports of countries like China, Kenya, the Philippines, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Senegal, Tunisia, Vietnam. 3500 EPZs in 130 countries of the world now employ 66 
Million people, among these 40 million employees in China.  
 
 
 ‘low comparative price levels’ or ‘unequal exchange/unequal transfer’ 
(Kohler/Tausch, 2001) is operationalized here simply by ERD or ERDI, the exchange 
                                                 
10
 most notably Jorgenson, 2003; 2004a, 2004b; 2005; 2006a, 2006b; 2007a, 2007b; 2008; 2009a, 2009b; 2009c, 
2009d; Jorgenson, and Burns, 2004, 2007; Jorgenson and Clark, 2009; Jorgenson and Kuykendall, 2008; 
Jorgenson, Austin and Dick, 2009; Jorgenson, Dick and Mahutga, 2007. 
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rate deviation index, which measures the degree, to which globalization has 
contributed to lowering the international price level of a country; i.e. it is an indicator 
about the openness of the price system vis-à-vis the pressures of dependent insertion 
into the global economy. Ever since Balassa, 1964 and Samuelson, 1964, economists 
have linked the comparative price level to the price relationship between tradables and 
non-tradables. Neoliberals assume that globalization will lead towards a lowering of 
comparative price levels around the globe. ERD is calculated by the ratio between 
GDP at purchasing power parities, divided by GDP at current exchange rates 
(Kohler/Tausch, 2001). 
 
 For dependency authors, foreign savings show the weight that foreign savings, mostly 
from the centers and richer semi-peripheries, have in the accumulation process of the 
host countries in the periphery and semi-periphery. It is calculated by the difference 
between the share of investments per GDP and the share of savings per GDP.  
 
 
Choropleth Map 1 – to Map 6 all summarize the available evidence about these variables on a 
global scale. The data and their definitions and sources are freely available from 
http://www.social-sciences-and-humanities.com/journal/?p=3402 and http://www.social-
sciences-and-humanities.com/journal/?p=2017.  
  11 
 
Choropleth Map 1: MNC penetration  
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Choropleth Map 2: Increase of MNC penetration over time - DYN MNC PEN 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
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Choropleth Map 3: MNC headquarter status’ (MNC HEADQU) 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
 
Choropleth Map 4: FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population 
(fourth root) 
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Choropleth Map 5: low comparative price levels 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Choropleth Map 6: foreign savings 
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
These three theoretical positions – the neo-liberal approach, the ‘neo-Keynesian’ 
Kalecki/Steindl-paradigm, and the dependency/world systems research, inspired a great 
number of empirical studies not only on economic growth, but also on sustainable 
development. 
 
The cross-national analysis of the effects of migration patterns on the development of the 
countries of the world system is only of a more recent date (Hatton and Williamson, 2009; 
  14 
Sanderson, 2010). Considering the enormous quantity of migration-related human transport 
and its environmental impacts around the globe, to our knowledge, there is as yet not a single 
essay available on the relationship between the freedom of movement and the environment. 
The divisive issue of migration policy divides opinions around the globe, and it also divides 
opinions among the global social science research community. In dealing with the issue of 
migration, we first might notice that there is hardly any solid cross-national evidence 
available about the macro-societal effects of migration on national development.  
 
Most liberal and left of the center-oriented global political discourse would expect that 
worker remittances have very general, beneficial general and also environmental effects for 
the sending countries, and that they amount to a very huge transfer machine of wealth from 
the rich, migration recipient countries to the poor, migration sending countries (Ziesemer, 
2009). Migration is thus seen as a win-win situation (Taylor, 1999, 2006; UNDP HDR, 
2009). UNDP HDR 2009 maintains that financial remittances are vital in improving the 
livelihoods of millions of people in developing countries. There is a positive contribution of 
international remittances to household welfare, nutrition, food, health and living conditions in 
places of origin. Even those whose movement was driven by conflict can be net remitters, as 
illustrated in history in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea- Bissau, Nicaragua, Tajikistan and 
Uganda, where remittances helped entire war-affected communities to survive. In some 
international migration corridors, money transfer costs have tended to fall over time, with 
obvious benefits for those sending and receiving remittances. An important function of 
remittances is to diversify sources of income and to cushion families against setbacks such as 
illness or larger shocks caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or climatic vagaries 
(UNDP HDR, 2009: 72).  
 
Choropleth Map 7: worker remittances as % of GDP (fourth root) 
 
0,00
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source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html  
 
Similarly, the UNDP also maintains that there should be significant aggregate gains from 
movement, both to movers and to destination countries. The destination countries will capture 
about one-fifth of the gains from a 5 percent increase in the number of migrants in developed 
countries, amounting to US$190 billion dollars. Immigration increases employment, with no 
evidence of crowding out of locals, and investment also responds vigorously to immigration. 
  15 
Population growth due to migration increases real GDP per capita in the short run, one-for-
one (meaning that a 1 percent increase in population due to migration increases GDP by 1 
percent). However, not all of the optimistic forecasts of the liberal migration policy school of 
thought can be maintained on a 1:1 basis. It cannot be excluded out of hand that inward 
migration increases – ceteris paribus – the environmental strain variables in the migration 
recipient countries due to the direct, mostly transport related effects a society based on large-
scale immigration implies, but also because of the priorities in favor of economic growth and 
not the environment, which are observable in the majority of the migration sending countries 
in international value surveys (protecting environment vs. economic growth – data from the 
latest wave of the World Values Survey, 2004-2007; World Values Survey, September 20th 
2010, online data analysis from http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp). 
 
 
3. Developing the research design  
 
 
The data and their definitions and sources are freely available from http://www.social-
sciences-and-humanities.com/journal/?p=3402 and http://www.social-sciences-and-
humanities.com/journal/?p=2017. Our investigation duly acknowledges many of the key 
determinants of economic growth, mentioned in the economic literature (see also de Haan, 
Lundstrom and Sturm, 2006; Dollar, 1992a, 1992b; Hamid, 2007; Laver and Shepsle, 1999; 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 2007; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller, 2004; 
Tausch/Heshmati, 2011), like current shares of the country’s inhabitants in total world 
population, calculated from UNDP data; the famous Heritage Foundation 2000 Economic 
Freedom Score; absolute geographical latitude, adapted from Easterly’s growth theory; the 
UNDP figures for long-term annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%); the trade-off 
between development level and development performance, otherwise also known in 
economics as ‘conditional convergence’ (ln GDP per capita; ln GDP per capita ^2); the simple 
Huntingtonian fact of whether a country is Muslim country, to be measured by the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (now Organization of Islamic Cooperation) (OIC) 
Membership or by Muslim population share (Nationmaster); UNDP data on the simple 
geographical fact of population density (based on the CIA’s World Factbook); UNDP data on 
public education expenditure per GDP; and the UNDP education index, combining the 
enrolment rates at the primary, secondary and tertiary education level. We also take into 
account UNDP figures on military expenditures per GDP and the openly available CIA data 
on military personnel rate, which are key variables of contemporary political science 
international relations theory and peace research. In our analysis, we also show the theoretical 
and practical (political) potential of the following drivers of development, which are 
somewhat a ‘terra incognita Australis’ in the hitherto existing macro-sociological debate, like 
migration and European (Monetary) Union membership
11
.  
 
The choice of a country to be included in the final analysis (175 countries) was determined by 
the availability of fairly good data series for these independent variables (if not mentioned 
otherwise, UNDP data for the middle of the first decade of the new millenium, contained in 
the dataset Tausch, 2011). In the final regressions, we applied the ‘listwise delition of missing 
values’ routine. The statistical design of our study is thus based on the usual, SPSS-XXII 
ordinary least square standard regression (SPSS, 2007) of the ‘kitchen sink type’ (Durlauf et 
al., 2008; Laver and Shepsle, 1999) of economic growth and economic, social and political 
                                                 
11
 For an extensive list on the usage of these control variables in recent literature, see Tausch and Heshmati, 
2011: 34-36. 
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performance in the research tradition of Barro, 2003. Prior stepwise regression procedures 
selected the significant among the total list of 26 available predictors. Surveying the vast 
econometric literature on the subject of the possible drivers and bottlenecks of development of 
a given country, one also finds support for the inclusion of geographic and demographic 
variables in the comparative analysis of development success or failure (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2003, Barro 1991, 1996, 1998). 
 
 
4. The main results: beyond the pro-globalist 
environment approach  
 
 
We will now briefly present the results of our standard OLS multiple regression analyses. In 
our view, the regression results, presented in the Appendix 3 of this work, present the best 
available choice of variables from both the theoretical as well as statistical perspective. In 
testing the implications of the competing paradigms, we arrive at the following list of multiple 
regressions with very significant statistical results: 
 
 
Table 2: the final results from multiple regression analysis: The properties of the 
statistical investigations 
 
 
 adj R^2 df F error probability of 
the entire equation 
 
Global footprint 81.200 135 117.592 .000 
Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI) 
78.900 140 88.259 .000 
Happy Life Years 77.100 102 86.653 .000 
CO2 per capita 72.700 159 71.594 .000 
avoiding net trade of ecological 
footprint gha per person 
40.900 138 20.111 .000 
Happy Planet Index 38.000 119 19.217 .000 
Carbon emissions per million US 
dollars GDP 
35.000 144 16.535 .000 
ln (number of people per mill 
inhabitants 1980-2000 killed by 
natural disasters per year+1) 
14.400 159 7.713 .000 
 
 
So let us now see the results in detail. First we concentrate on the effects of the variables, 
measuring the four economic freedoms of trade, capital, services and labor. Our first analysis 
deals with the impact of world economic openness on the main indicators of the 
environment. It emerges that the impact of liberal policies on the quality of environmental 
policy is not necessarily and generally negative. In the world system, some of the most 
persistent sinners in terms of CO2 and SO2 output, poisoning lands, rivers and woodland 
were the Communist dictatorships, which ruled East-Central Europe until 1989/90. Thus it is 
no surprise that world economic openness does not increase, but decreases – ceteris paribus – 
CO2 emissions per capita.  
 
The significant influence of comparative price levels, measuring the level of services, on our 
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chosen indicators is equally clear. Neo-liberal theories start from the assumption that low 
comparative price levels will be an advantage for the development process, and high 
comparative price levels will impede the development trajectory. Our empirical results 
confirm the fact that a liberal framework does not necessarily impede a good ecological 
performance. It can be shown that high comparative price levels indeed lead necessarily 
towards a higher involvement in the net trade of ecological footprint gha per person.  
 
Now let us measure the effects of the freedom of capital. The main thrust of the serious 
apprehensions of research, critical of neo-liberal globalization is fully vindicated by the 
significant effects of the foreign savings rate. High foreign savings are indeed a driver of 
global footprint, and are a blockade against a satisfactory Happy Planet Index performance. 
 
The New International Division of Labor (NIDL)-model, based on free production zones or 
export processing zones, featured in the critical theories of globalization since the 1970s, most 
prominently in the works of Froebel, Heinrichs, and Kreye, and which best can be measured 
by the indicator free production zones employment as % of total population, is one of the 
prime drivers of high CO2 per capita emissions.  
 
MNC penetration, the master variable of most quantitative dependency theories, blocks 
environmental performance (EPI-Index) and several other socially important processes 
 
 
MNC PEN - stock of Inward 
FDI per GDP 
quintile share income difference 
between richest and poorest 20% 
0.221 0.013 
 Infant mortality 2005 0.160 0.000 
 democracy measure -0.147 0.011 
 Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI) 
-0.113 0.005 
 rule of law -0.090 0.168 
 
 
Now let us measure the effects of the freedom of labor. Worker remittances have a 
significant effect on the environment. They have a positive effect on the Happy Planet Index, 
and Happy Life Years. We can assume that the export of labor to the world economy indeed 
has beneficial effects on life quality (Happy Planet Index, Happy Life Years). We can also 
assume that the import of labor to the world economy has – ceteris paribus - detrimental 
effects on life quality (Happy Planet Index, Happy Life Years).  
 
The consensus of a large and ever-growing tradition of research would tend to see the effects 
of international migration on the recipient countries in very positive terms, the political noise 
from migra-phobic politicians to the contrary. However, not all of the optimistic forecasts 
of this liberal school of thought can be maintained empirically or at least on a 1:1 basis. 
Why should the globalization of three freedoms - capital, goods and services - be so 
socially and environmentally destructive in its consequences – as the critical public in 
Western countries thinks, while freedom number four – labor – should have only 
positive effects, fully described by neo-liberal economics? Why should one be a 
globalization critic in the case of the freedom of trade, capital and services, and be neo-liberal 
at the same time concerning the effects of freedom number four, labor? We already hinted 
above at the fact that we can assume from the effects of worker remittances that the import of 
labor to the world economy has – ceteris paribus - detrimental effects on life quality (Happy 
Planet Index, Happy Life Years).  
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Also, the percentage of the population with what today is called an ‘immigration 
background’ has – ceteris paribus – a negative effect on some other key indicators of the 
environment. Immigration, and all the transport activities it causes, increases without 
question the CO2 output of a given society, and it also increases the ratio of carbon 
emissions per GDP.  
 
But there are not only clear-cut detrimental effects. Also, there are positive ones. Interestingly 
enough, a large share of people with migration background per total population also is 
significantly associated with a lower number of people per million inhabitants 1980-2000 
killed by natural disasters per year, but this ratio might also reflect past migration patterns 
from disaster prone regions to safer places with less disasters over the earlier decades, 
reflected in higher ratios of people with migration background per total population decades 
later.  
 
Now let us analyze the effects of the other, controlling variables. In accordance with neo-
liberal approaches, and in discord with the mainstream of globalization-critical research, 
Economic Freedom as such has a significant positive impact on indicators of the 
environment. The environmental variable, affected by economic freedom in a good direction, 
is carbon emissions per GDP.  
 
The UNDP education index as the chosen predictor for the long-standing UNDP human 
capital propelled development approach has the predicted significant and beneficial effects 
on  
 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 
ln (number of people per mill inhabitants 1980-2000 killed by natural disasters per year+1) (reduction of disaster 
risk) 
 
The significant effects of military expenditures per GDP on the environment are rather 
limited in comparison to the other drivers and bottlenecks of international development, under 
investigation here. They significantly diminish the number of Happy Life Years, indicating a 
ceteris paribus negative trade-off not with life expectancy, but with life quality as such, as 
measured by the Happy Life Years Indicator. The burden of the military effort thus has a 
limited negative effect on life quality.  
 
Our research results suggest that – ceteris paribus – high military personnel rates are a 
bottleneck of the environmental performance, as measured by the Yale/Columbia EPI Index.  
 
The best single measure on the control, which women exercise over the structures of national 
government, arguably is the indicator ‘% women in government, all levels’, which goes 
much beyond the ministerial level and looks at different layers of government, i.e. the top 
political and administrative sphere, where the real decisions on the day-to-day running of a 
given country are being taken. It is the globally leading indicator of established feminist 
power. However, there is also a darker side to the whole story, although the effects are only 
significant at the 7.4% and the 5.2% level. Ceteris paribus it holds that structures, where ‘real 
existing feminism’ plays an important role, are tending towards a higher involvement in the 
international trade of ecological footprint, the most visible sign of globalization, affecting the 
environment either as net exporters or net importers of ecological footprint. The result 
indicate that real existing, established feminist power – under the conditions of ‘real existing 
globalization’ has not come to terms positively with all the environmental indicators under 
scrutiny here. 
 
  19 
Our empirical investigations also show that European Union and or European Monetary 
Union membership have rather small beneficial effects. There are only two significant 
positive effects to be reported in this context, and both concern a comparable dimension of 
environmental policy. The member countries of the European Monetary Union are good at 
reducing ecological footprint. Likewise, years of EU-membership coincide with avoiding net 
trade of ecological footprint.  
 
We will now look closer at the significant effects of the geographical, demographical and 
historical determinants of development performance, which cannot be influenced by short-
term or, in many cases, even long-term actions of governments, and which have to be 
interpreted as ‘givens’, which a country faces today. 
 
Let us start with the effects of absolute latitude, a variable, which often appears in the 
econometrical literature on drivers and bottlenecks of development performance, but which is 
outside the domain of interest of the mainstream of empirical dependency and world-systems 
research. Predictably, and due to climatic reasons, latitude has a very strong and significant 
effect on carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP, and has a considerable negative effect 
on life satisfaction.  
 
Population density seems to affect the ecological costs of infrastructure, and significantly 
reduces CO2 emissions per capita and global footprint.  
 
The percentage share of a given country in current world population today, and hence, 
population size, has an independent and ceteris paribus negative development effect on the 
EPI Environmental Performance Index.  
 
Our empirical results also suggest a new perspective on the curve-linear relationships between 
development level and environmental development performance. Let us clearly distinguish 
here between the old ‘Kuznets hypothesis’ of first deteriorating, and then improving income 
inequalities, and the ‘Matthews effect’ of rising, and then shrinking (economic) growth rates. 
In our research, we could establish that, after taking care of the direction of the indicators, 
there is a wide array of first improving and then deteriorating environmental 
performances. They all concern the environment and the health/basic human needs 
dimensions: 
 
 
avoiding CO2 per capita 
avoiding global footprint 
avoiding net trade of ecological footprint gha per person 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 
Happy Planet Index 
 
 
The pessimistic essence of the Kuznets curve with rapidly increasing societal problems and 
very deficient development performances at middle stages of development holds for the 
following phenomena of the ecological efficiency of the economy, and avoiding disaster risk. 
All these effects suggest that ‘things get worse before they get better’: 
 
 
avoiding carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP 
avoiding ln (number of people per mill inhabitants 1980-2000 killed by natural disasters per year+1) 
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The following variables wield no significant effects: for the globalization critical paradigm of 
Volker Bornschier, an important control variable was MNC headquarter status. But it has 
no significant effect on any of our environmental variables. Increases in MNC penetration 
over time had no significant effect on the environment. Net international migration rates, 
2005-2010, which is a typical migration flow measure, do not affect significantly any of our 
environment development indicators. Also, the ceteris paribus effects of membership in the 
Islamic Conference and Muslim population shares cannot be reduced to a simplistic 
reasoning. They do not affect any of our chosen environmental indicators in a significant way. 
Also, the share of public education expenditures per GDP has no significant effects on any 
of our environmental indicators. Annual population growth also has no significant effect on 
any of the environmental development indicators. 
 
 
5. Implications for the Arab countries 
 
 
Globalization increased rapidly the world over and also in the twenty-two Arab countries 
throughout much of the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond right to the onset of the global economic 
crisis in 2008, when we observe a certain anti-globalization backlash. This robust overall 
tendency is documented in the time series graph of Appendix 1 of this article for the nineteen 
Arab countries and the Palestinian Territories with available data from the ETH Zurich KOF 
Globalization Index data archive. 
12
 
 
Appendix 2 documents for sixteen members of the Arab League the relevant Global Footprint 
Network data on environmental strains from 1961 onwards. 
13
 Almost the entire Arab World – 
with the exception of Mauretania and Somalia - seems now to be running ecological deficits, 
with Footprints larger than their own biological capacity. The Global Footprint Network is 
correct in emphasizing that the implications of ecological deficits can be devastating, leading 
to resource loss, ecosystem collapse, debt, poverty, famine and war.  
 
The pressures of globalization (Appendix 1), rising ecological footprint and shrinking 
biocapacity (Appendix 2) and concomitant global value change (Appendix 4) will contribute 
towards an increase of the importance of environmental issues in the Arab world in the 
coming years. Without question, already the time series data from available indices – like the 
KOF-Index of Globalization (2015) and Ecological Footprint Network data on ecological 
footprint and biocapicity - all point in the direction that in objective terms the Arab World 
will be confronted by a synchronous increase of these phenomena in the coming years. In 
addition, the newly available opinion data from the recently released World Values Survey (6) 
for twelve members of the Arab League (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Tunisia, and Yemen), containing almost 70% 
of the population of the countries of the Arab League show to us that membership rate 
environmental organizations, participation in environmental demonstrations and giving 
priority to protecting the environment over economic growth are already a factor in those 
countries. Their weight will increase in the years to come, given the general and very robust 
underlying tendencies. 
 
Appendix 4 makes available these new opinion data on environmental activism and 
environmental consciousness in the Arab World. Given that the tendencies of globalization 
                                                 
12
 http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/  
13
 http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/  
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are omnipresent, that the ecological situation in much of the region is precarious and that 
environmental consciousness and also protest movements are on the rise, we cannot but speak 
about an inescapable tendency towards the “greening of Arab politics”.  
 
The most comprehensive state of the global environment index in the countries of the world is 
the Yale/Columbia University Environmental Performance Index. 
14
 It measures the 
performance of 178 countries on 20 indicators reflecting national-level environmental data. 
These indicators are combined into nine issue categories, each of which fit under one of two 
overarching objectives: Environmental Health and Ecosystem Vitality.  
 
Environmental Health measures the protection of human health from environmental harm. 
Ecosystem Vitality measures ecosystem protection and resource management.  
 
These two objectives are further divided into nine issue categories that span high-priority 
environmental policy issues, including air quality, forests, fisheries, and climate and energy, 
among others. The twenty key indicators are: 
 
1) Probability of dying between a child's first and fifth birthdays (between age 1 and 5) 
2) Percentage of the population using solid fuels as primary cooking fuel. 
3) Population weighted exposure to PM2.5 (three- year average). 
4) Proportion of the population whose exposure is above WHO thresholds (10, 15, 25, 35 
micrograms/m3). 
5) Percentage of population with access to improved drinking water source. 
6) Percentage of population with access to improved sanitation. 
7) Wastewater treatment level weighted by connection to wastewater treatment rate. 
8) Subsidies are expressed in price of their product in the domestic market (plus any 
direct output subsidy) less its price at the border, expressed as a percentage of the 
border price (adjusting for transport costs and quality differences). 
9) Scoring of whether countries have signed on to the Stockholm Convention and allow, 
restrict, or ban the "dirty dozen" POPs that are common agricultural pesticides. 
10) Forest loss - Forest gain in > 50% tree cover, as compared to 2000 levels. 
11) Catch in metric tons from trawling and dredging gears (mostly bottom trawls) divided 
by EEZ area. 
12) Percentage of fishing stocks overexploited and collapsed from EEZ. 
13) Percentage of terrestrial biome area that is protected, weighted by domestic biome 
area. 
14) Percentage of terrestrial biome area that is protected, weighted by global biome area. 
15) Marine protected areas as a percent of EEZ. 
16) Percent of critical habitat sites as designed by the Alliance for Zero Extinction 
protected. 
17) Change in CO2 emissions per unit GDP from 1990 to 2010. 
18) Change in Trend of CO2 emissions per unit GDP from 1990 to 2000; 2000 to 2010. 
19) Change in CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production. 
20) Percent of population with access to electricity. 
 
Table 3 and Choropleth Map 8 list the performance of the countries of the world and the Arab 
countries in particular on the Yale/Columbia EPI indicator. While Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates belong to the top 25% of the countries of world society 
according to the EPI Index, Comoros, Djibouti, Iraq, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen 
                                                 
14
 http://epi.yale.edu/  
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belong to the bottom 25% performers in world society and must be categorized as the 
ecological problem areas of the Arab world in the years to come. 
 
By contrast, Table 4 and Appendix 4 show to us that consciousness and activism in 
environmental areas is most developed in the relatively richer countries of Qatar and Libya, 
while in the other Arab countries with available World Values Survey data, environmental 
activism as yet did not materialize in a way as suggested by the data on the already existing 
objective environmental conditions. 
 
 
Table 3: Environmental Performance Index (Yale Columbia) in the Arab World 
 
 
 EPI Score Global 
rank 
percentile performance 
EPI Score (178 
countries) 
United Arab Emirates 72,91 25 14,04 
Saudi Arabia 66,66 35 19,66 
Kuwait 63,94 42 23,60 
Qatar 63,03 44 24,72 
Egypt 61,11 50 28,09 
Tunisia 58,99 52 29,21 
Jordan 55,78 60 33,71 
Syria 54,50 68 38,20 
Morocco 51,89 81 45,51 
Bahrain 51,83 82 46,07 
Lebanon 50,15 91 51,12 
Algeria 50,08 92 51,69 
Oman 47,75 99 55,62 
Libya 42,72 120 67,42 
Iraq 33,39 149 83,71 
Comoros 31,39 153 85,96 
Yemen 30,16 157 88,20 
Djibouti 28,52 161 90,45 
Mauritania 27,19 165 92,70 
Sudan 24,64 171 96,07 
Somalia 15,47 178 100,00 
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Choropleth Map 8: Yale Columbia Environmental Performance Index 
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Choropleth Map 8: Yale Columbia Environmental Performance Index (color version) 
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  25 
 
Table 4: the growing environmental activism among Arab publics (comparison on a global scale among 57 countries
15
 with complete data 
from the World Values Survey, Wave 6) 
 
 
 membership rate 
environmental 
organizations 
% participated in 
environmental 
demonstrations 
% saying: 
protecting 
environment 
priority 
global rank 
environmental 
organizations 
global rank 
environmental 
demonstrations 
global rank 
environment 
priority 
average global 
rank 
Qatar 5,50 11,70 63,10 12 9 6 9,00 
Libya 3,40 10,00 54,50 21 11 21 17,67 
Lebanon 5,80 15,80 39,90 11 5 41 19,00 
global 
average 
3,40 6,90 47,50 20 25 32 25,67 
Kuwait 2,60 10,70 27,20 24 10 56 30,00 
Palestinian 
Territories 
1,50 5,10 46,80 34 34 34 34,00 
Morocco 0,50 3,20 53,20 49 42 24 38,33 
Iraq 0,80 3,00 43,00 44 44 37 41,67 
Algeria 0,90 3,90 31,20 41 38 53 44,00 
Jordan 0,70 2,80 35,80 46 45 47 46,00 
Yemen 0,90 2,40 33,00 43 47 51 47,00 
Tunisia 0,20 2,10 32,00 58 50 52 53,33 
Egypt 0,30 1,20 30,50 54 54 55 54,33 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The global average is counted as the imaginary country number 58 in the percentile performance scales in Appendix 4 of this essay 
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5. Conclusions and prospects  
 
 
Our macro-quantitative results should be seen in the framework of the recent tendency of 
cross-national research to focus on the effects of ‘smart development’ and ‘environmental 
cross-national economics’ (Dietz, Rosa and York, 2007, 2009; Sanderson, 2010; Tausch and 
Heshmati, 2011; Veenhoven, 1996; York, Rosa and Dietz, 2003). For the countries of the 
world system, we should state first of all that not all liberal approaches to environmental 
policies are falsified. In accordance with neo-liberal approaches, and in discord with the 
mainstream of globalization-critical research, Economic Freedom has a significant positive 
impact on indicators of the environment. It also emerges that world economic openness does 
not increase, but decreases – ceteris paribus – CO2 emissions per capita. The significant 
influence of lowering comparative price levels, i.e. the globalization of services, on our 
chosen indicators is equally clear. Our empirical results confirm the fact that a liberal 
framework does not necessarily impede a good ecological performance. It can be shown that 
high comparative price levels indeed lead necessarily towards a higher involvement in the net 
trade of ecological footprint gha per person. Reducing the net trade of ecological footprint gha 
per person is intrinsically linked to the globalization of services. 
 
What are then the effects of the globalization of goods, labor and capital on the environment? 
Only a part of the main thrust of research, sympathizing with globalization critical 
movements, which is so prominent today in the literature, is fully vindicated by the significant 
effects of the foreign savings rate. High foreign savings, and hence, a reliance on foreign 
sources of savings, are indeed a driver of global footprint, and are a blockade against a 
satisfactory Happy Planet Index performance. The New International Division of Labor 
(NIDL)-model, emerges one of the prime drivers of high CO2 per capita emissions. MNC 
penetration, the master variable of most quantitative dependency theories, blocks 
environmental performance (EPI-Index). Worker remittances have a significant positive effect 
on the Happy Planet Index, and Happy Life Years. The percentage of the population with an 
‘immigration background’ has – ceteris paribus – a negative effect on some other key 
indicators of the environment. Immigration, and all the transport activities it causes, increases 
the CO2 output of a given society, and it also increases the ratio of carbon emissions per 
GDP.  
 
The most comprehensive state of the global environment index in the countries of the world is 
the Yale/Columbia University Environmental Performance Index. 
16
 While Kuwait, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (just as, by the way, the State of Israel) belong to the 
top 25% of the countries of world society according to the EPI Index, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Iraq, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen belong to the bottom 25% performers in world 
society and must be categorized as the ecological problem areas of the Arab world in the 
years to come. 
 
We also established that consciousness and activism in environmental areas is most developed 
in the relatively richer countries of Qatar and Libya, while in the other Arab countries with 
available World Values Survey data, environmental activism as yet did not materialize in a 
way as suggested by the data on the already existing objective environmental conditions. 
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To arrive at a concluding perspective for the region’s democratization process, we might say 
here that in this article we re-analyzed the solid macro-political and macro-sociological 
evidence on a global scale, published in the world’s leading peer-reviewed social science 
journals, which seems to indicate that there are contradictions between unfettered 
globalization and unfettered world economic openness and sustainable development. Like 
several recent studies, most notably Jorgenson, 2003; 2004, 2005, 2006 we suggest that there 
seems to be a strong interaction between ‘transnational capitalist penetration’ and 
‘environmental degradation’. Global, European and also Arab policy-making finally should 
dare to take the globalization-critical organizations of ‘civil society’ seriously (Brand et al., 
2008).  
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Appendix 1: The KOF Index of Globalization in the Arab World from 1970 
onwards – the overall Index 
 
 
2015 KOF Index of Globalization    
    
 Indices and Variables  Weights 
A. Economic Globalization  [36%] 
 i) Actual Flows  (50%) 
  Trade (percent of GDP) (22%) 
  Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (27%) 
  Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (24%) 
  Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) (27%) 
 ii) Restrictions  (50%) 
  Hidden Import Barriers (24%) 
  Mean Tariff Rate (28%) 
  Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) (26%) 
  Capital Account Restrictions (23%) 
    
B. Social Globalization  [38%] 
 i) Data on Personal Contact  (33%) 
  Telephone Traffic (25%) 
  Transfers (percent of GDP) (3%) 
  International Tourism (26%) 
  Foreign Population (percent of total population) (21%) 
  International letters (per capita) (25%) 
    
 ii) Data on Information Flows  (35%) 
  Internet Users (per 1000 people) (36%) 
  Television (per 1000 people) (38%) 
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  Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (26%) 
    
 iii) Data on Cultural Proximity  (32%) 
  Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (44%) 
  Number of Ikea (per capita) (44%) 
  Trade in books (percent of GDP) (11%) 
    
C. Political Globalization  [26%] 
  Embassies in Country (25%) 
  Membership in International Organizations (27%) 
  Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%) 
  International Treaties (26%) 
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The overall KOF-Globalization Index for the Arab World 
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Appendix 2: Global Footprint Network data on environmental strains in the Arab 
World from 1961 onwards 
 
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/footprint_for_nations/ 
 
Each country has its own ecological risk profile: Many are running ecological deficits, with Footprints larger than their own biological capacity. 
Others depend heavily on resources from elsewhere, which are under increasing pressure. 
  
In some areas of the world, the implications of ecological deficits can be devastating, leading to resource loss, ecosystem collapse, debt, poverty, 
famine and war. 
  
The Ecological Footprint is a resource accounting tool that helps countries understand their ecological balance sheet and gives them the data 
necessary to manage their resources and secure their future. 
 
National governments using the Footprint are able to: 
1.Assess the value of their country’s ecological assets  
2.Monitor and manage their assets  
3.Identify the risks associated with ecological deficits  
4.Set policy that is informed by ecological reality and makes safeguarding resources a top priority 
 5.Measure progress toward their goals 
 
 
The graphs track the per-person Ecological Footprint and biocapacity in the Arab world since 1961. Both are measured in global hectares. 
Biocapacity per person varies each year with ecosystem management, agricultural practices (such as fertilizer use and irrigation), ecosystem 
degradation, and weather, and population size. Footprint per person varies with consumption amounts and production efficiency. Where a dotted 
line is shown, interpolation estimates have been used by the Global Footprint Network in place of highly unlikely outliers in the results. While most 
input data for the Footprint accounts come from UN statistical sources, the quality of country results varies. The quality of the assessment is scored 
on a 1-6 scale, and is provided for the Arab world in the upper-right corner of the graph. 
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Appendix 3: multiple regressions – the dependency model, tested against feminist, 
demographic, neoliberal, geographic, cultural, peace research, human capital 
policy predictors, migration theories and integration theories 
 
 
Predictors (pre-selection of the significant predictors by prior selection, using stepwise regression) 
 
 
% women in government, all levels 
% world population 
2000 Economic Freedom Score 
Absolute latitude 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 %) 
comparative price levels (US=1.00) 
foreign savings rate 
FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of total population 
ln GDP per capita 
ln GDP per capita ^2 
Membership in the Islamic Conference 
military expenditures per GDP 
military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) 
MNC outward investments (stock) per GDP 
MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP 
MNC PEN: DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
population density 
public education expenditure per GNP 
UNDP education index 
worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 
Muslim population share per total population 
net international migration rate, 2005-2010 
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Years of membership in the EU, 2010 
years of membership in EMU, 2010 
 
The reported equations were chosen from the following dependent variables: 
 
 
ecological footprint (g ha /cap) 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 
Happy life years 
Happy Planet Index, HPI 
avoiding net trade of ecological footprint gha per person  
ln (number of people per mill inhabitants 1980-2000 killed by natural disasters per year+1) 
Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP 
Carbon emissions per capita 
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Dependent 
variable 
results from stepwise regression statistical 
propertie
s 
statistical 
propertie
s 
statistical 
properties 
statistical 
properties 
statistical 
properties 
Development 
dimension 
Environmental 
Performance 
Index (EPI) 
Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
environment 
 Constant -66.751 27.623  -2.417 0.017  
 % world population -0.548 0.216 -0.100 -2.536 0.012  
 ln GDP per capita 23.041 6.605 2.158 3.489 0.001  
 ln GDP per capita ^2 -1.084 0.374 -1.750 -2.898 0.004  
 military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) -3.298 0.806 -0.174 -4.091 0.000  
 MNC PEN - stock of Inward FDI per GDP -0.094 0.033 -0.113 -2.871 0.005  
 UNDP education index 36.930 4.216 0.560 8.760 0.000  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  78.900 140.000 88.259 .000   
Global footprint Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
environment 
Global footprint Constant 31.026 4.440  6.988 0.000  
 foreign savings rate 0.017 0.009 0.082 1.872 0.063  
 ln GDP per capita -8.365 1.065 -4.870 -7.851 0.000  
 ln GDP per capita ^2 0.580 0.063 5.838 9.203 0.000  
 population density 0.000 0.000 -0.089 -2.283 0.024  
 years of membership in EMU, 2010 -0.128 0.042 -0.141 -3.037 0.003  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  81.200 135.000 117.592 .000   
ln (number of 
people per mill 
inhabitants 1980-
Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
environment 
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2000 killed by 
natural disasters 
per year+1) 
 Constant -15.273 5.398  -2.830 0.005  
 ln GDP per capita 4.262 1.287 3.751 3.312 0.001  
 ln GDP per capita ^2 -0.247 0.074 -3.741 -3.355 0.001  
 UNDP education index -2.011 0.839 -0.289 -2.397 0.018  
 Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) -0.018 0.012 -0.124 -1.497 0.136  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  14.400 159.000 7.713 .000   
CO2 per capita Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
environment 
 Constant 32.170 12.138  2.650 0.009  
 FPZ (free production zones) employment as % of 
total population 
0.331 0.063 0.238 5.281 0.000  
 ln GDP per capita -9.438 2.877 -2.104 -3.281 0.001  
 ln GDP per capita ^2 0.706 0.168 2.713 4.214 0.000  
 Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share per GDP + 
import-share per GDP) 
-0.020 0.006 -0.164 -3.240 0.001  
 population density -0.001 0.001 -0.121 -2.710 0.007  
 Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 0.168 0.025 0.348 6.811 0.000  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  72.700 159.000 71.594 .000   
Carbon emissions 
per million US 
dollars GDP 
Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
environment 
 Constant -6595.543 1383.628  -4.767 0.000  
 2000 Economic Freedom Score -7.988 3.279 -0.236 -2.436 0.016  
 Absolute latitude 12.325 2.012 0.544 6.125 0.000  
 ln GDP per capita 1792.705 325.022 5.614 5.516 0.000  
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 ln GDP per capita ^2 -111.407 19.201 -6.024 -5.802 0.000  
 Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 8.903 2.615 0.267 3.404 0.001  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  35.000 144.000 16.535 .000   
avoiding net trade 
of ecological 
footprint gha per 
person 
Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
global ecological 
justice 
 Constant -85.394 31.144  -2.742 0.007  
 % women in government, all levels -0.130 0.072 -0.125 -1.801 0.074  
 comparative price levels (US=1.00) -8.056 2.312 -0.401 -3.485 0.001  
 ln GDP per capita 22.761 7.550 3.880 3.015 0.003  
 ln GDP per capita ^2 -1.436 0.462 -4.195 -3.109 0.002  
 Years of membership in the EU, 2010 0.234 0.050 0.396 4.716 0.000  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  40.900 138.000 20.111 .000   
Happy Planet 
Index 
Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
happiness 
 Constant -280.000 46.695  -5.996 0.000  
 foreign savings rate -0.236 0.112 -0.189 -2.105 0.037  
 ln GDP per capita 73.912 11.094 7.100 6.662 0.000  
 ln GDP per capita ^2 -4.158 0.649 -6.908 -6.411 0.000  
 worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0.587 0.135 0.356 4.346 0.000  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  38.000 119.000 19.217 .000   
Happy Life Years Independent Variable B standard 
error 
Beta t-value error 
probability 
happiness 
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 Constant -87.614 35.855  -2.444 0.016  
 ln GDP per capita 19.100 8.451 1.542 2.260 0.026  
 ln GDP per capita ^2 -0.460 0.490 -0.644 -0.938 0.350  
 military expenditures per GDP -0.754 0.318 -0.113 -2.370 0.020  
 worker remittance inflows as % of GDP 0.257 0.112 0.118 2.295 0.024  
 memorandum item: statistical properties of the 
equation 
adj R^2 df F error 
probability 
of the entire 
equation 
  
  77.100 102.000 86.653 .000   
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Appendix 4: World Values Survey data on environmental activism (World Values 
Survey, wave 6) 
 
 
 % active membership rate (per total adult population) in environmental organizations 
 % of the total adult population already participated in environmental demonstrations 
 % of the total adult population saying: protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and 
some loss of jobs 
 global rank % active membership rate (per total adult population) in environmental organizations 
 global rank % of the total adult population already participated in environmental demonstrations 
 global rank % of the total adult population saying: protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic 
growth and some loss of jobs 
 average global rank 
 percentile performance % active membership rate (per total adult population) in environmental organizations 
 percentile performance % of the total adult population already participated in environmental demonstrations 
 percentile performance % of the total adult population saying: protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower 
economic growth and some loss of jobs 
 average percentile performance 
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 membership 
rate 
environment
al 
organizations 
environme
ntal 
demonstrat
ions 
protecting 
environme
nt priority 
global rank 
environme
ntal 
organizatio
ns 
global rank 
environme
ntal 
demonstrat
ions 
global rank 
environment 
priority 
average 
global rank 
percentile 
performance 
membership 
rate  
percentile 
performance 
environmental 
demonstrations 
percentile 
performance 
environment 
priority 
average 
percentile 
performance 
Colombia 9,50 18,10 67,00 4,00 3,00 2,00 3,00 6,90 5,17 3,45 5,17 
Mexico 7,10 14,40 62,80 7,00 6,00 9,00 7,33 12,07 10,34 15,52 12,64 
Peru 3,90 21,30 62,90 17,00 2,00 7,00 8,67 29,31 3,45 12,07 14,94 
Qatar 5,50 11,70 63,10 12,00 9,00 6,00 9,00 20,69 15,52 10,34 15,52 
Philippines 15,50 5,40 64,90 1,00 32,00 4,00 12,33 1,72 55,17 6,90 21,26 
Hong Kong 8,00 8,80 58,60 6,00 14,00 17,00 12,33 10,34 24,14 29,31 21,26 
Malaysia 3,10 8,40 73,60 23,00 17,00 1,00 13,67 39,66 29,31 1,72 23,56 
Chile 1,60 13,70 66,70 32,00 7,00 3,00 14,00 55,17 12,07 5,17 24,14 
India 12,90 29,50 38,10 2,00 1,00 43,00 15,33 3,45 1,72 74,14 26,44 
Kyrgyzstan 4,30 7,70 59,30 15,00 18,00 14,00 15,67 25,86 31,03 24,14 27,01 
Australia 4,20 7,60 59,00 16,00 20,00 16,00 17,33 27,59 34,48 27,59 29,89 
Libya 3,40 10,00 54,50 21,00 11,00 21,00 17,67 36,21 18,97 36,21 30,46 
Lebanon 5,80 15,80 39,90 11,00 5,00 41,00 19,00 18,97 8,62 70,69 32,76 
Taiwan 9,70 3,10 60,60 3,00 43,00 12,00 19,33 5,17 74,14 20,69 33,33 
Ecuador 2,20 7,70 61,20 29,00 19,00 11,00 19,67 50,00 32,76 18,97 33,91 
Uzbekistan 1,10 8,50 62,10 37,00 15,00 10,00 20,67 63,79 25,86 17,24 35,63 
Brazil 2,40 7,40 60,30 27,00 22,00 13,00 20,67 46,55 37,93 22,41 35,63 
Nigeria 7,10 17,20 33,80 8,00 4,00 50,00 20,67 13,79 6,90 86,21 35,63 
Thailand 6,40 5,00 57,50 10,00 35,00 18,00 21,00 17,24 60,34 31,03 36,21 
South Africa 6,60 9,80 38,30 9,00 12,00 42,00 21,00 15,52 20,69 72,41 36,21 
Ghana 5,40 5,50 50,30 13,00 30,00 25,00 22,67 22,41 51,72 43,10 39,08 
Argentina 2,40 7,30 54,20 26,00 23,00 22,00 23,67 44,83 39,66 37,93 40,80 
Uruguay 0,50 7,60 64,20 50,00 21,00 5,00 25,33 86,21 36,21 8,62 43,68 
  56 
global 
average 
3,40 6,90 47,50 20,00 25,00 32,00 25,67 34,48 43,10 55,17 44,25 
Sweden 1,50 5,00 62,90 35,00 36,00 8,00 26,33 60,34 62,07 13,79 45,40 
New Zealand 8,30 4,60 42,60 5,00 37,00 38,00 26,67 8,62 63,79 65,52 45,98 
South Korea 2,60 6,10 48,20 25,00 29,00 27,00 27,00 43,10 50,00 46,55 46,55 
Cyprus 3,10 6,40 47,00 22,00 27,00 33,00 27,33 37,93 46,55 56,90 47,13 
Pakistan 0,90 12,60 45,70 42,00 8,00 35,00 28,33 72,41 13,79 60,34 48,85 
Zimbabwe 3,60 7,10 37,30 19,00 24,00 45,00 29,33 32,76 41,38 77,59 50,57 
United States 4,70 6,20 37,20 14,00 28,00 46,00 29,33 24,14 48,28 79,31 50,57 
Kuwait 2,60 10,70 27,20 24,00 10,00 56,00 30,00 41,38 17,24 96,55 51,72 
Kazakhstan 1,80 3,40 53,90 31,00 41,00 23,00 31,67 53,45 70,69 39,66 54,60 
Germany 2,40 3,50 47,70 28,00 40,00 29,00 32,33 48,28 68,97 50,00 55,75 
Georgia 0,20 6,60 59,10 57,00 26,00 15,00 32,67 98,28 44,83 25,86 56,32 
Romania 1,30 9,20 34,80 36,00 13,00 49,00 32,67 62,07 22,41 84,48 56,32 
Palestinian 
Territories 
1,50 5,10 46,80 34,00 34,00 34,00 34,00 58,62 58,62 58,62 58,62 
Turkey 1,00 3,60 48,00 40,00 39,00 28,00 35,67 68,97 67,24 48,28 61,49 
Rwanda 3,70 5,50 22,10 18,00 31,00 58,00 35,67 31,03 53,45 100,00 61,49 
Morocco 0,50 3,20 53,20 49,00 42,00 24,00 38,33 84,48 72,41 41,38 66,09 
Slovenia 1,90 2,20 44,50 30,00 49,00 36,00 38,33 51,72 84,48 62,07 66,09 
Spain 0,30 8,50 35,20 55,00 16,00 48,00 39,67 94,83 27,59 82,76 68,39 
China 0,50 0,60 56,60 48,00 57,00 19,00 41,33 82,76 98,28 32,76 71,26 
Iraq 0,80 3,00 43,00 44,00 44,00 37,00 41,67 75,86 75,86 63,79 71,84 
Estonia 0,70 2,00 47,70 45,00 51,00 31,00 42,33 77,59 87,93 53,45 72,99 
Belarus 0,30 1,10 56,20 53,00 55,00 20,00 42,67 91,38 94,83 34,48 73,56 
Russia 0,40 1,80 50,20 51,00 52,00 26,00 43,00 87,93 89,66 44,83 74,14 
Netherlands 1,00 1,50 40,90 39,00 53,00 39,00 43,67 67,24 91,38 67,24 75,29 
Ukraine 0,30 2,80 47,70 56,00 46,00 30,00 44,00 96,55 79,31 51,72 75,86 
Algeria 0,90 3,90 31,20 41,00 38,00 53,00 44,00 70,69 65,52 91,38 75,86 
  57 
Poland 1,60 0,90 37,60 33,00 56,00 44,00 44,33 56,90 96,55 75,86 76,44 
Armenia 0,50 2,40 40,10 47,00 48,00 40,00 45,00 81,03 82,76 68,97 77,59 
Jordan 0,70 2,80 35,80 46,00 45,00 47,00 46,00 79,31 77,59 81,03 79,31 
Azerbaijan 0,30 5,20 31,10 52,00 33,00 54,00 46,33 89,66 56,90 93,10 79,89 
Yemen 0,90 2,40 33,00 43,00 47,00 51,00 47,00 74,14 81,03 87,93 81,03 
Japan 1,00 0,30 22,70 38,00 58,00 57,00 51,00 65,52 100,00 98,28 87,93 
Tunisia 0,20 2,10 32,00 58,00 50,00 52,00 53,33 100,00 86,21 89,66 91,95 
Egypt 0,30 1,20 30,50 54,00 54,00 55,00 54,33 93,10 93,10 94,83 93,68 
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